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The States Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will 
likely vote in 2010 on whether to amend the Rome Statute to allow the ICC 
to prosecute the crime of aggression. If a robust amendment is widely rati-
fied by states, and if the mechanism for triggering ICC jurisdiction in a par-
ticular situation is the ICC itself, then the ICC may emerge as an important 
voice in the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention taken 
without Security Council authorization. Prosecutions, or at least indict-
ments, of leaders of those interventions would considerably strengthen the 
hand of those who regard such intervention as illegal. Yet an unwillingness 
on the part of the ICC to indict and prosecute those leaders—an outcome 
that seems likely for incidents of true humanitarian intervention—may lend 
considerable credence to the view that such intervention is lawful, as well 
as define the conditions that characterize such intervention.
INTRODUCTION  
The doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” essentially contem-
plates the use of military force by one state (or a group of states) against 
another state not in self-defense but, rather, to prevent the widespread de-
privation of human rights. While such use of force might occur pursuant to 
authorization of the Security Council, the doctrine’s principal relevance is to 
serve as a potential legal justification for a state or states to act without Se-
curity Council authorization, conduct sometimes referred to as “unilateral” 
humanitarian intervention. 
As discussed in Part I below, the dominant belief among states and 
scholars of international law is that unilateral humanitarian intervention is 
not a valid legal justification for using force. Security Council authorization 
must be obtained for any such intervention; where such consent is not forth-
coming, the values served by maintaining a strong normative system against 
transnational uses of force must prevail over values advanced in attempting 
to thwart human rights abuses. Some states and scholars, however, see in-
ternational law as permitting such intervention, and some incidents of state 
practice—such as NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia to protect Kosovar 
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Albanians from the anticipated infliction of atrocities by their own govern-
ment—lend credence to that position. On this account, since human rights 
are now an integral component of international law, the failure of a sove-
reign to uphold its obligations to protect its nationals concomitantly dimi-
nishes that sovereign’s right to rely on the principle of non-intervention to 
protect it from other states. Further, even some observers who reject the 
notion that unilateral humanitarian intervention is presently lawful neverthe-
less recognize that the law may be changing, or that the international com-
munity will tolerate deviations from the law when unilateral humanitarian 
intervention occurs.  
Scholars attempting to resolve this debate have looked to various 
sources as a means of supporting one position or the other. When assessing 
incidents of state practice that arguably constitute unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, one approach has been to scrutinize the formal and informal 
reactions to those incidents by important organs, such as the Security Coun-
cil, the General Assembly, or the International Court of Justice, since these 
entities might be seen as serving as a “jury” for the global community about 
the legality of the conduct. This jurying function might be performed before 
the intervention takes place (ex ante jurying) or, more likely, after the inter-
vention takes place (ex post jurying). To date, the above-mentioned organs 
have been unable or unwilling to consistently assess incidents of alleged 
humanitarian intervention, thus undermining their ability to forcefully con-
demn, support, or support with caveats the legality of unilateral humanita-
rian intervention. 
One jury, however, “remains out” in the sense that it has not yet 
weighed in on the issue of humanitarian intervention. As discussed in Part 
II, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, which created the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), will likely vote in 2010 on whether to 
amend the Rome Statute so as to allow the ICC to investigate and prosecute 
the crime of aggression. The language to be adopted is not yet settled, but it 
seems unlikely that unilateral humanitarian intervention will be expressly 
included or excluded from the Rome Statute’s definition of aggression, or 
from the associated “elements of the crime” that will likely be crafted be-
fore entry into force of the amendment. While the amendment (and asso-
ciated elements) may provide some openings for the argument that unilater-
al humanitarian intervention implicitly does not fall within the scope of such 
a crime, it seems more likely that the acts that typically underlie such inter-
vention (large-scale deployment of troops or delivery of bombs across a 
border against a non-consenting government) will implicitly fall within the 
scope of the crime of aggression for purposes of the ICC. If that is the case, 
this article argues that there is an ironic chance (but not certainty) that the 
ICC, over time, will serve as a “jury” that results in the crystallization of a 
norm permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
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Numerous hurdles must be overcome before the ICC could serve 
such a function, hurdles that should not be minimized. An amendment to the 
Rome Statute does need to be adopted by the Assembly, most of the states 
parties must then ratify the amendment to bring it into force, the amendment 
must be crafted so as not to allow states parties to opt out of its reach in any 
significant ways, and the amendment must be applied in a manner that 
reaches the conduct of states generally, including non-parties that use force 
against the territory of states parties. 
Even if those hurdles are overcome, the mere fact that the ICC 
mandate is broad enough to potentially encompass prosecutions of leaders 
who engage in unilateral humanitarian intervention will likely not affect the 
debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention; such an effect would 
occur only if the Rome Statute expressly included (or excluded) such inter-
vention as part of the crime of aggression. Further, if the mechanism for 
triggering ICC investigation of a crime of aggression is solely the Security 
Council, or perhaps the General Assembly or the International Court of Jus-
tice, then the ICC’s adoption of this jurisdiction likely will not affect the 
debate over the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, since it is 
unlikely that those institutions will consistently, impartially, and apolitically 
“pull the trigger” for ICC jurisdiction over a given situation, conditions ne-
cessary for clarifying the law in this area.  
However, if a relatively robust amendment is widely ratified by 
states, and if the mechanism for triggering an ICC investigation is the ICC 
itself (the prosecutor acting alone or in conjunction with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber), then this article maintains that there may well be a significant 
effect on the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention, driven by 
how the ICC responds when incidents of unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion arise over which it has jurisdiction. Prosecutions, or at least indict-
ments, of leaders of those interventions would considerably strengthen the 
hand of those who oppose unilateral humanitarian intervention. Yet an un-
willingness on the part of the ICC to indict and prosecute those leaders—an 
outcome that seems quite likely for incidents of true humanitarian interven-
tion—may lend considerable credence to the view that unilateral humanita-
rian intervention is lawful, as well as define the conditions that characterize 
such intervention.  
To demonstrate that likelihood, this article revisits NATO’s 1999 
intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians. Having reached that incident’s 
tenth anniversary, it is worth asking whether such action, had it arisen at a 
time when there existed an ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion, would have resulted in the indictment of NATO leaders by the ICC. If 
not, then it may unfold that true humanitarian interventions—interventions 
generally recognized as largely altruistic acts to protect those facing ex-
treme peril—will be viewed as lawful even in the absence of Security 
Council authorization. If so, then the ICC will have assumed a very signifi-
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cant role in altering the perceptions of the international community concern-
ing the use of force, potentially in a manner that significantly diminishes the 
role of the U.N. Security Council. Assumption of such a role may propel the 
ICC to significant heights as the “go-to” arbiter on the legality of the use of 
force, or may result in extraordinary criticism of its work and concerns 
about its fidelity to strict construction of the law. 
Part I of this article briefly explains the conflicting views among 
states and in the academy about the legality of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, and why several possible avenues for “jurying” legality to date 
have proven unhelpful. Part II then considers the likely approach of granting 
the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, with a focus on the ratifi-
cation process for the amendment, and on the substance and procedure of 
that jurisdiction as it relates to humanitarian intervention. If various impor-
tant hurdles can be overcome (which may well not be the case), this part 
tentatively concludes that such jurisdiction most likely will result, over 
time, in the crystallization of a norm that permits unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. Part III tests that conclusion by revisiting the Kosovo incident, 
which is probably the strongest precedent to date in favor of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention, to assess whether it would have provoked ICC 
indictments had there existed, at that time, an ICC with jurisdiction over a 
crime of aggression. Part IV concludes with some speculations on how in-
clusion of a robust crime of aggression within the ICC’s jurisdiction might 
affect views not just on the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, 
but also on what is meant by such intervention, and further the potential 
benefits and risks for the ICC in assuming such a role. 
I. THE (IL)LEGALITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
A. Conflicting Views on the Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian In-
tervention
Virtually all states, key non-state actors, and scholars agree that 
humanitarian intervention may proceed when authorized by the U.N. Secu-
rity Council.1 While it is true that the drafters of Chapter VII of the U.N. 
  
1 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Welsh, The Security Council and Humanitarian Intervention, in 
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 535, 535–36 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 
2008) (“[W]hile the Council initially was reluctant to authorize force in circumstances in-
volving the mistreatment of a state’s civilians, it has gradually asserted its competence 
through an expanded definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and securi-
ty.”); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND 
ARMED ATTACKS 137 (2002) (“Each of the instances in which the Council has used, or autho-
rized coalitions of the willing to use collective measures . . . against regimes engaged in 
egregious human rights violations can be fitted in to the Charter text.”); SEAN D. MURPHY, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 287-
88 (1996) (reflecting on U.N. practice in the 1990’s and noting that a “threat to the peace” 
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Charter probably envisaged some kind of transnational threat to or breach of 
the peace prior to Security Council action, the Charter does not expressly 
require such an act, nor does it preclude viewing the transnational agitation 
that typically arises from widespread deprivations of human rights within a 
state from being within the scope of Chapter VII. In any event, the consis-
tent interpretation of Chapter VII by the Security Council—particularly with 
respect to the recent interventions authorized in Haiti, Rwanda, and Soma-
lia—makes clear that widespread deprivations of human rights can serve as 
the basis for authorizing the use of military force under the authority of 
Chapter VII.2 
The more contentious issue is the legality of humanitarian interven-
tion without U.N. Security Council authorization. The remainder of this 
article is concerned with such unauthorized or “unilateral” humanitarian 
intervention. Most states and scholars view unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention as unlawful, finding no basis in the U.N. Charter or state practice in 
support of the doctrine.3 Only rarely have incidents occurred that might be 
viewed as unilateral humanitarian intervention, and, when they do occur, 
they are often criticized or condemned by states and sometimes other rele-
vant actors, such as the Security Council or the General Assembly. Writing 
in the immediate aftermath of the Kosovo intervention, Adam Roberts ex-
plained the resistance of states to unilateral humanitarian intervention as 
follows: 
Several large and powerful states (China, India and Russia) have expressed 
strong opposition to the principle of humanitarian intervention. Equally 
important, large numbers of post-colonial states, particularly in Africa and 
Asia, have opposed it. Many such states have a healthy suspicion of the 
proposition that the motives of would-be intervenors are, and will remain, 
purely humanitarian. Also, many such states see themselves as vulnerable 
to foreign intervention, and are understandably sensitive about threats to 
their newly-won sovereignty. In some cases, other and less creditable con-
siderations are involved, including the desire of oppressive regimes to stop 
                                                     
triggering Security Council jurisdiction under Chapter VII is now regarded as encompassing 
internal conflict, including humanitarian crises).
2 See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 145–281. 
3 See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 49 (2d ed. 
2004) (2000) (finding that “the doctrine is far from firmly established in international law”); 
Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanita-
rian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177, 177–203 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keo-
hane eds., 2003); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–87 (2001); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and 
the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1999). 
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the emergence of a new norm that might upset their monopoly of power 
within their states.4 
Either in the context of specific incidents or looking more broadly 
at the legality of uses of military force, the General Assembly historically 
has disfavored intervention, even for noble purposes, as amply demonstrat-
ed by the three prominent General Assembly resolutions on non-
intervention passed in the 1960s and 1970s.5 Indeed, the General Assem-
bly’s 1974 “Definition of Aggression” enumerated various acts that consti-
tute “aggression,” including the “invasion or attack by the armed forces of a 
State of the territory of another State,” and provided that no “consideration 
of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may 
serve as a justification for aggression.”6 Those resolutions were passed in an 
era when newly emerging states were reacting to the abuses of colonialism, 
and to the fear of Cold War interference by the major powers, but many of 
those suspicions linger today.7 When foreign ministers of the non-aligned 
movement met in Catagena in 2000, they reiterated a “firm condemnation of 
all unilateral military actions including those made without property autho-
risation from the United Nations Security Council” and rejected “the so-
called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention, which has no legal basis in the 
  
4 See Adam Roberts, The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention, 2000 Y.B. 
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 32.  
5 See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 
1966) (“No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in 
the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all 
other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against 
its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned. . . . The strict observance of 
these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with 
one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and 
letter of the Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which 
threaten peace and security.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1971) (“No 
State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason what-
ever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention 
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.”). 
 6 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), annex, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1975). 
 7 Drawing in part upon the General Assembly’s views, the International Court in the 
Nicaragua/U.S. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case cast 
doubt on the ability of states to use force to protect human rights, (Nicar. V. U.S.), Merits, 
Judgments, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 134–35 (June 27), or to bring about regime change, id. at 133, ¶ 
263, though in that case the facts and arguments pled to the Court were not directly on those 
issues. 
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UN Charter or in the general principles of international law.”8 Most recent-
ly, in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document, the General Assembly 
considered the problem of responding to major human rights crises through 
military force and appeared to contemplate only action through the U.N. 
Security Council.9 
Generally speaking, opponents of unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion favor the strictest of controls on transnational uses of force, distrusting 
the creation of loopholes that aggressors will seek to exploit. Some oppo-
nents, however, are open to the possibility of humanitarian intervention, but 
simply do not see existing treaties or state practice as supporting it. Espe-
cially in the wake of the Kosovo incident, some of these scholars10 and for-
mer U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan11 became more open to seeing a 
  
 8 MOVEMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, XIII Ministerial Conference, Cartagena, 
Colombia, FINAL DOCUMENT, ¶ 11, 263 (Apr. 8-9, 2000), available at http://www.nam.gov 
.za/xiiiminconf/index.html. 
 9 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 
24, 2005) (“In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council . . . on a case-by-case basis . . . should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”); but see Stahn, infra 
note 19, at 120 (arguing that “states did not categorically reject the option of (individual or 
collective) unilateral action in the Outcome Document. This discrepancy leaves some leeway 
to argue that the concept of responsibility to protect is not meant to rule out such action in the 
future.”). 
10 See, e.g., INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: 
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 172 (2000) [hereinafter Kosovo 
Report] (“[T]he current fluidity of international law on humanitarian intervention, caught 
between strict Charter prohibitions of non-defensive uses of force and more permissive pat-
terns of state practice with respect to humanitarian interventions and counter-terrorist use of 
force.”); Christine Chinkin, The Legality of NATO’s Action in the Former Republic of Yugos-
lavia (FRY) Under International Law, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 910, 920 (2000) (acknowledg-
ing that there may be an “emerging concept of humanitarian intervention based upon the 
purposes of the Charter, the growing commitment to the active protection of human rights 
and limited State practice”); Vaughan Lowe, International Legal Issues Arising in the Koso-
vo Crisis, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 934, 941 (2000) (“[I]n my view there is no clear legal 
justification for the NATO action in Kosovo, but it is desirable that such a justification be 
allowed to emerge in customary international law.”). 
 11 In his annual report to the General Assembly in 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
stated: 
This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians 
from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the 
international community. Any such evolution in our understanding of State sove-
reignty and individual sovereignty will, in some quarters, be met with distrust, 
skepticism, even hostility. But it is an evolution that we should welcome. Why? 
Because, despite its limitations and imperfections, it is testimony to a humanity 
that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do 
more, and not less, to end it. 
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nascent trend toward acceptance of humanitarian intervention, but did not 
go so far as to find that a new rule had crystallized. 
By contrast, some scholars and a few states, notably the United 
Kingdom12 and Belgium,13 have claimed that there already exists a legal 
norm in favor of unilateral humanitarian intervention, based on interpreta-
tions of the U.N. Charter or on a generous reading of limited state practice, 
including the interventions of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra 
Leone in 1998, the tripartite intervention in northern Iraq in 1991 and south-
ern Iraq in 1992, and the Kosovo incident, all of which were largely ac-
cepted or at least tolerated by the global community.14 While they place 
                                                     
Press Release, The Secretary-General, Annual Report to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
SG/SM7136 (Sept. 20, 1999), reprinted in KOFI ANNAN, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: 
STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 44 (1999). For sharp criticism of the Secretary-
General’s position, see Edward Luttwak, Kofi’s Rule: Humanitarian Intervention and Neoco-
lonialism, 58 NAT’L INT. 60 (Winter 1999–00). 
 12 The United Kingdom justified its participation in the intervention relating to Kosovo as 
follows: 
We are in no doubt that NATO is acting within international law. Our legal justifi-
cation rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circums-
tances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Those circumstances clearly exist in 
Kosovo. The use of force . . . can be justified as an exceptional measure in support 
of the purposes laid down by the UN Security Council, but without the Council’s 
express authorization, when that is the only means to avert an immediate and 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. 
U.K. Defence Secretary George Robertson, 328 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 616–17; 
see also U.N. SCOR, Fifty-Fourth Sess., 3988 mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 23, 
1999) (comments of U.K. Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock explaining that: “In these 
circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian 
necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable”); Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings, 
Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. U.K.), at 13 (May 11, 1999), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/113/4573.pdf (U.K. Attorney-General John Morris repeat-
ing such language); Prime Minister Tony Blair, Written Answer for House of Commons, 330 
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 239-40; MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 99 (2005) (discussing 
the U.K. position). It should be noted that the U.K. House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee rejected the U.K. position, finding that international law did not allow unilateral 
humanitarian intervention. See HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
FOURTH REPORT ON KOSOVO, 1999-2000, ¶ 128, available at http://www.publications.parlia 
ment.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2802.htm (“Our conclusion is that Operation
Allied Force was contrary to the specific terms of what might be termed the basic law of the 
international community—the UN Charter.”); see also Steven Wheatley, The Foreign Affairs 
Select Committee Report on Kosovo: NATO Action and Humanitarian Intervention, 5 J. 
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 261 (2000). 
13 See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, Oral Proceed-
ings at 7 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4515.pdf. 
14 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN 
FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008); CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: LAW AND POLICY (2001); see also Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Interven-
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some emphasis on positive law (as evidenced by treaties, state practice, and 
other forms of state consent), proponents of unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention often advance arguments that are essentially grounded in morality, 
natural law, or political theory.15 Indeed, to a certain extent one can view the 
legal debate on this issue as one between “positivists” (opposing unilateral 
humanitarian intervention) and “naturalists” (favoring such intervention by 
adhering closely—even if not explicitly—to natural law, derived from the 
rudimentary values held by the “global society”). For the proponents of 
humanitarian intervention, international law exists only in part to preserve 
the sanctity of states; the dignity of persons is of equal value and in some 
situations “trumps” the values protected by strict rules on non-intervention. 
In between these two positions may be found a few scholars or in-
stitutions that view humanitarian intervention as unlawful, but accept or at 
least acknowledge that such action may be legitimate and hence will be 
tacitly accepted by the global community when it occurs. For example, Pro-
fessor Thomas Franck states that it is “difficult conceptually to justify in 
Charter terms the use of force by one or several states acting without prior 
Security Council authorization, even when such action is taken to enforce 
human rights and humanitarian values,” but that contemporary practice 
“suggests either a graduated reinterpretation by the United Nations itself of 
Article 2(4) or the evolution of a subsidiary adjectival international law of 
mitigation, one that may formally continue to assert the illegality of state 
recourse to force but which, in ascertainable circumstances, mitigates the 
consequence of such wrongful acts by imposing no, or only nominal, conse-
quences on states which, by their admittedly wrongful intervention, have 
demonstrably prevented the occurrence of some greater wrong.”16 Along 
                                                     
tion: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL 
WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974). 
15 See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW 
AND MORALITY (3d ed. 2005) (advancing an argument largely grounded in Kantian philoso-
phy); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 295 (2000) (advancing an “solidarist” conception of international 
society in which states must accept a moral responsibility to protect their citizens). 
 16 Franck, supra note 1, at 137, 139 (emphasis added); see also Thomas M. Franck, Hu-
manitarian and Other Interventions, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 325 (2005) (suggest-
ing that “a violation of the law is not always deplorable and may even be a good thing”); 
Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 130 (J. L. 
Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT’L AFFAIRS AND 
ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES   OF PUB. INT’L LAW, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2000), 
available at http://cms.web-beat.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/AIV_13_Eng.pdf (report by 
non-governmental Dutch advisory council which endorses the “illegal but legitimate” con-
cept); Ige F. Dekker, Illegality and Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, 6 J. CONFLICT 
& SEC. L. 115 (2001) (discussing the Dutch report); DANISH INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 103 (1999) (“Despite the 
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this line, an Independent International Commission on Kosovo, initiated by 
Sweden shortly after the Kosovo incident and chaired by former South Afri-
can Justice Richard Goldstone, issued a report stating that the NATO mili-
tary intervention was illegal under international law, because it did not have 
the consent of the Security Council, but was “legitimate,” both from a polit-
ical and moral point of view.17 Similarly, an International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (established by the Government 
of Canada) issued a December 2001 report, entitled The Responsibility to 
Protect, which sought to provide a legal and ethical foundation for humani-
tarian intervention.18 The report asserted that a responsibility to protect (or 
“R2P”)19 exists under international law. Further, the report stated that in 
circumstances when the Security Council fails to discharge that responsibili-
ty, “in a conscience-shocking situation crying out for action,” then it “is a 
real question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the dam-
age to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the dam-
age to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council 
stands by.”20  
By contrast, a 2005 U.N. high-level panel convened by Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, writing in the wake of the 2003 U.S. intervention in 
Iraq, agreed with the ICISS that there existed an “emerging norm that there 
is a collective international responsibility to protect,” but concluded that 
armed force may be used to ensure fulfillment of that the responsibility only 
if so authorized by the Security Council.21 Further, the high-level panel 
identified five criteria of “legitimacy” when engaging in such intervention, 
                                                     
lack of a legal basis for humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorisation in 
existing international law, it is hardly realistic in the foreseeable future that states should 
altogether refrain from such intervention if it is deemed imperative on moral and political 
grounds.”); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 118, 125-26 
(1991) (finding that while unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegal, if supported gener-
ally by states it should be pardoned). 
 17 KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 163–98 (2000). 
 18 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp [herei-
nafter THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT]. 
 19 For a discussion of the emergence of this concept, see Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to 
Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007); Carlo 
Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many 
Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 191 (2008); see also Lee 
Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004, 
136, 137 (“Like the responsibility to protect, the duty to prevent begins from the premise that 
the rules now governing the use of force, devised in 1945 and embedded in the UN Charter, 
are inadequate.”). 
 20 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 18, ¶ 6.37. 
 21 The Secretary-General, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2005); see also id. ¶¶ 196, 272. 
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including to the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the inter-
veners, the exhaustion of other means, proportionality, and a balancing of 
the ensuing consequences.22 The U.N. Secretary-General thereafter general-
ly endorsed the high-level panel’s approach,23 though without expressly 
adopting the five criteria or expressly ruling out unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. 
An important component in the diversity of views on this issue con-
cerns the role of the Security Council. Proponents of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention view the Council as an unreliable arbiter of the legality of uses 
of force, since some permanent members have been willing to block actions 
that a majority on the Security Council sees as appropriate. Again, the Ko-
sovo incident presents the dilemma; many Security Council members fa-
vored armed intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians, but Russia (along 
with China) opposed doing so. By contrast, opponents of unilateral humani-
tarian intervention argue that the whole point in drafting the U.N. Charter 
was to create a system that—unlike the League of Nations system—would 
attract participation by the major powers by according them a special status 
for determining when non-defensive uses of force should be deployed and 
when they should not. By moving away from that system, the special status 
of the permanent members of the Security Council is degraded, thereby 
introducing a level of instability in the system by making it less attractive to 
the major powers. For opponents of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the 
solution to the problem of Security Council inaction is not to abandon the 
existing system, but instead to remain faithful to the Charter as written, with 
the hope that the permanent members will generally act in unison when 
situations truly requiring humanitarian intervention arise. Indeed, opponents 
of unilateral humanitarian intervention point out that Security Council un-
willingness to authorize intervention often arises from the reluctance of any 
state to step forward with the resources needed to respond to a humanitarian 
crisis, a problem that is not solved by altering the focal point for authorizing 
intervention. 
Another important component in the debate over unilateral humani-
tarian intervention concerns the current status of the United States in inter-
national affairs. The United States is the preeminent military, diplomatic, 
economic, political, and cultural power in the world. The United States can 
marshal the resources needed for humanitarian intervention around the 
globe in a way that is largely not available to any other state. At least in the 
short run, many opponents of humanitarian intervention are not very wor-
ried about lots of other states aggressively invoking the doctrine of humani-
  
22 Id. ¶ 207. 
 23 The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Hu-
man Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
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tarian intervention, at least no more so than they are worried about those 
states invading neighbors on spurious grounds of self-defense. Instead, 
many worry about an unchecked United States—in conjunction with its 
allies—deploying military force to protect human rights when it wishes to 
do so, and refraining in situations where it prefers inaction. They would like 
to see more global supervision of the U.S. decision to intervene and perhaps 
even a global ability to prod the United States into action when it would 
otherwise stay home. 
B. Looking for an Arbiter of Legality 
States and scholars participating in this debate have emphasized dif-
ferent sources as a means of supporting one position or the other. When 
assessing incidents of state practice that arguably constitute unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention, one approach has been to scrutinize the formal and 
informal reactions of important organs, such as the Security Council, the 
General Assembly, or the International Court of Justice, since these entities 
might be seen as serving as a “jury” for the global community about the 
legality or legitimacy of the conduct. As Thomas Franck, who coined the 
term in this context, indicated: 
Pronouncing on the validity of claims advanced in mitigation of an unlaw-
ful but justifiable recourse to force is the task of those decision-makers. 
Some of this fact-and-context-specific calibration goes on in international 
tribunals, but most of it occurs in the political organs of the UN system, 
which constitutes something approximating a global jury; assessing the 
facts of a crisis, the motives of those reacting to the crisis, and the bona 
fides of the pleas of extreme necessity. This jurying goes on not only in in-
stances of humanitarian intervention but whenever there is a confrontation 
between the strict, literal text of the Charter and a plea of justice and exte-
nuating moral necessity.24 
This jurying function might be performed before the intervention 
takes place (ex ante jurying) or, more likely, after the intervention takes 
place (ex post jurying). For Professor Franck, these organs have “demon-
strated their ability and readiness, when faced with states’ recourse to force, 
to calibrate their responses by sophisticated judgment, taking into account 
the full panoply of specific circumstances.”25 Consequently, after analyzing 
eight incidents of possible unilateral humanitarian intervention, Franck con-
cludes that the “jurors” have regarded such actions as being justified.26  
  
 24 FRANCK, supra note 1, at 186. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. at 135–73. 
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Professor Franck’s approach has intuitive appeal. The original 
meaning of the U.N. Charter can change in light of subsequent U.N. prac-
tice, even on core issues relating to the Security Council. The U.N. Charter 
is, after all, a multilateral treaty (“albeit a treaty having certain special cha-
racteristics”)27 one that is subject to the customary rules of treaty interpreta-
tion, which take account of both the object and purpose of the treaty and of 
subsequent state practice.28 There is ample World Court jurisprudence sup-
porting the use of subsequent state practice when interpreting the charters or 
constitutions of international organizations, as well as supporting the use of 
a principle of effectiveness, whereby the Court seeks to determine the pur-
poses and objectives of the organization and to give to the words in question 
an interpretation which is most conducive to the achievement of those 
ends.29 To a certain extent, the entire history of Security Council conflict 
management is one that finds no clear textual support in the U.N. Charter: 
the numerous U.N. peacekeeping deployments have no express or even 
strongly implied basis in the Charter; and Security Council authorization of 
forcible deployments—such as authorization of the coalition of states that 
expelled Iraq from Kuwait—are not firmly anchored in the original scheme 
of Articles 43-49, which contemplated national contingents being made 
available to the United Nations “on its call” for deployment under U.N. 
command and control. 30  
At the same time, Professor Franck’s approach has been criticized 
for failing to explain certain methodological choices that are implicit in his 
analysis.31 Most of the analysis turns on the conduct of the Security Council, 
rather than other organs, which is an important methodological choice, since 
it favors “jurying” by just fifteen states, including the five powerful perma-
nent members, rather than the broader community of states. Further, it is not 
clear how Franck’s methodology weighs the reluctance of intervenors to 
explicitly base their action upon a right of humanitarian intervention, nor 
why the failure of an organ to act should be construed as tacit approval of an 
intervention.  
In fact, the above-mentioned U.N. organs have been unable or un-
willing consistently either to authorize or to prohibit recourse of humanita-
rian intervention ex ante, or to scrutinize incidents of alleged humanitarian 
  
 27 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 157 (July 20). 
28 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 5, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
 29 See generally Elihu Lauterpacht, Development of the Law of International Organization 
by the Decisions of International Tribunals, 152 RECUEIL DES COURS 414–65 (1976-IV). 
 30 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, art. 43, 59 Stat. 1031, TS 993 [hereinafter 
U.N. Charter]. 
31 See Michael Byers, Book Review, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 721 (2003). 
354 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:341 
intervention after they have arisen, thus undermining those organs’ ability to 
forcefully condemn, support, or support with caveats the legality of unila-
teral humanitarian intervention. Ex ante authorization by the Security Coun-
cil sometimes has been possible (thereby obviating any need to resort to 
unilateral humanitarian intervention), but no other organ has acted ex ante 
either to authorize or to prohibit unilateral humanitarian intervention. Some 
have speculated that, after Kosovo, perhaps Security Council practice would 
evolve into use of an “inverted veto” on issues of humanitarian intervention, 
whereby any collective intervention would be deemed permissible unless 
the Security Council passed a resolution precluding the action.32 No appar-
ent consensus has formed among states regarding the acceptability of such 
an approach, perhaps because it opens a rather wide loophole. Any group of 
states, perhaps as small as just a few, could declare themselves a “collectivi-
ty” and proceed with an intervention, so long as they are confident that they 
have the support of at least one permanent member (thereby avoiding a res-
olution cutting off the intervention). Further, any permanent member could 
conduct humanitarian interventions without worry, since it could always 
veto a Security Council resolution to the contrary. 
The problem with post hoc reactions by these organs is that they are 
unpredictable (sometimes formal reactions are made and sometimes they are 
not) and can be viewed as political in nature (it is not always clear that the 
members of the institution are reacting based on their perception of what 
international law requires, as opposed to each member’s political prefe-
rences). Thus, opponents and proponents of unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention, looking at the same practice of these institutions, will draw quite 
different conclusions about the meaning and relevance of the institutional 
conduct.  
Consider, for example, the possibility of looking to the General As-
sembly for ex ante or post hoc authorization or prohibition of an interven-
tion. This possibility is already available, under the General Assembly’s 
1950 “Uniting for Peace Resolution,”33 which contemplates General As-
sembly “recommendations” for military measures in response to breaches of 
the peace or acts of aggression. Under this resolution, any member state 
may request that the General Assembly convene an emergency session, 
which occurs promptly if a majority of U.N. members inform the Secretary-
  
 32 Louis Henkin speculated that “the likely lesson of Kosovo is that states, or collectivities, 
confident that the Security Council will acquiesce in their decision to intervene, will shift the 
burden of the veto; instead of seeking authorization in advance by resolution subject to veto, 
states or collectivities will act, and challenge the Council to terminate the action.” Louis 
Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 827 
(1999). 
 33 G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377 (V) (Nov. 3, 1950). The resolution was 
adopted by a vote of 52-5, with 2 abstentions. 
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General (or seven members of the Security Council) that they concur in the 
request.34 By doing so whenever a situation has arisen where unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention seems imminent, or has already occurred, the Gen-
eral Assembly could serve as the definitive “juror” on the legality of the 
matter. (Alternatively, the General Assembly might adopt an entirely new 
organic resolution specifically on the subject of humanitarian intervention, 
either flatly prohibiting it or in some fashion supporting it. In the latter case, 
such a resolution could conceivably contain an “inverse” authorization, 
meaning that a proposed humanitarian intervention, once notified to the 
General Assembly, can proceed unless there is an affirmative General As-
sembly vote that the intervention should not occur.) 
For political, formal, and practical reasons, the General Assembly 
has not assumed this mantle. Politically, there is disagreement among states 
on what to do about the issue of humanitarian intervention; there would 
likely not be a uniform position on either condemning or approving such 
action, or approving it subject to certain conditions. Formally, the U.N. 
Charter Chapter IV makes clear that the General Assembly plays a second-
ary role to the Security Council on matters relating to peace and security, 35 
which generally chills the General Assembly from taking a lead on such 
matters. Even if the Security Council is not exercising its “functions” in 
respect of a particular dispute or situation, the General Assembly is only 
supposed to make “recommendations” to the Security Council about how to 
proceed, which can be construed as supporting military deployments con-
sented to by the host state (the prototypical peacekeeping scenario), but not 
the deployment of military units for an enforcement action.36  
Moreover, as a practical matter, the General Assembly’s arrogation 
of power through the Uniting for Peace Resolution never fully developed 
during the Cold War despite constant deadlock at the Security Council. The 
problem was that, to conduct any significant military intervention, the fi-
nancial and military support of one or more of the major powers was 
needed, and those states did not wish to see the General Assembly take the 
lead in this area, since it would clearly detract from the power and signific-
ance of the Security Council.37 For the United States, this became especially 
true as the General Assembly mutated over time from something relatively 
within the control of the Western states to a body entirely outside their con-
trol. Consequently, if the General Assembly were to attempt an ex ante or 
  
 34 Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, Rule 8(b), U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.17 
(2008), available at http://www.un.org/ga/ropga.shtml. 
 35 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 12(1). 
36 See, e.g., N.D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
150-51 (2002). 
37 Id. 
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post hoc role for unilateral humanitarian interventions, it would likely face 
situations where (1) it votes in favor of military action, but finds no support 
among those states expected to conduct the action; (2) it votes in favor of a 
military action, and certain states prove willing to conduct that action, but 
those states neither wanted nor sought General Assembly approval; or (3) it 
votes against a military action, and one or more powers go forward anyway 
on grounds that the General Assembly cannot arrogate to itself this power. 
Any of these scenarios would weaken the authority of the General Assem-
bly, and inhibits this organ from venturing into the arena. 
The International Court of Justice also faces difficulty in serving as 
a reliable “juror” for either ex ante or post hoc authorization/prohibition of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention. In some ways, the International Court 
could be an ideal surrogate for a deadlocked Security Council; like the 
Council, the Court consists of fifteen members (judges), traditionally con-
sisting of five judges from each of the permanent members of the Security 
Council and ten judges from the different regions of the world. However, 
unlike the Security Council, there is no veto power in the International 
Court; judges from the major powers can and have been outvoted by the 
other judges. Although regarded by some as a bit ossified, the Court is a 
serious institution; there is a gravity to the work of the Court that garners 
respect in the legal world and there is a fair amount of fidelity by states to 
the Court’s rulings.38 Further, as a judicial institution its pronouncements 
are generally regarded as driven by law not politics. 
The Court, however, does not have jurisdiction simply to assume 
the role of deciding ex ante or post hoc the legality of a proposed/actual 
exercise of unilateral humanitarian intervention; the matter must be properly 
placed before the Court. The most likely manner for this to occur would be 
through a request for an advisory opinion from the General Assembly. 
Probably for the same reason that the General Assembly is resistant to serv-
ing itself as a “juror” of a proposed intervention, the General Assembly has 
declined to place potential incidents of humanitarian intervention, such as 
Kosovo, before the International Court for consideration. As for contentious 
cases, since the Court’s inception, jurisdiction over the lawfulness of forci-
ble action has arisen in only a handful of cases; states do not habitually 
resort to the court when force has been used against them, and when states 
do, they are often constrained in the jurisdictional basis that they can plead. 
Such jurisdictional limitation is amply demonstrated in Georgia’s recent 
case against Russia for the movement in August 2008 of extensive Russian 
troops into Georgia—a case predicated on an alleged Russian violation of 
Article 2(4), but instead on a violation of a human rights treaty concerning 
  
38 See generally CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2004). 
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racial discrimination.39 Hence, the Court’s capability for “jurying” on this 
subject is quite limited.40 
Regional organizations also face difficulty in serving as an ex ante 
or post hoc “juror” of the legality of recourse to humanitarian intervention. 
Chapter VIII of the Charter clearly contemplates the ability of states, operat-
ing regionally, to deal “with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.”41 
Yet while that language in Article 52(1) is not conditioned upon authoriza-
tion of the Security Council, in Article 53(1),42 where reference is made to 
“enforcement action,” Security Council authorization is required. Moreover, 
the credibility associated with non-defensive actions of regional organiza-
tions derives from the consent granted by their member states to help pro-
mote peace and security within the region; that theory breaks down when 
the regional organization is operating outside the region, such as NATO did 
in Serbia. 
In short, while various existing international entities above might 
serve as “jurors” of the legality of a proposed or actual resort to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, there are formal, practical, political, and institu-
tional difficulties in any one of them serving that function consistently. For 
that reason, the emergence of the ICC, and its anticipated jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression, might portend a significant development for assess-
ing the legality of humanitarian intervention. As discussed in the next sec-
tion, that role would not entail approving in advance an act of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention; an ex ante ICC approval process is not contem-
plated as part of the amendment of the Rome Statute. Rather, the ICC’s role 
will arise in the course of its reactions post hoc to instances of unilateral 
  
39 See Application Instituting Proceedings, Application of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.) 2008 I.C.J. __ (Aug. 
12), available at http://www.icj-cij.org. The treaty at issue is the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 40 If the Court were asked to provide an opinion ex ante, the Court likely would resist any 
association with the unleashing of military power, in part out of a general preference for the 
pacific settlement of disputes and in part from a concern of blessing an intervention that goes 
badly. Moreover, as a legal institution, the Court is not especially well-positioned, prior to an 
intervention, to weigh complex non-legal variables, such as the motives of intervening states, 
the efficacy of further diplomatic efforts, or the ramifications to regional security if an inter-
vention goes forward. A post hoc assessment of an act of humanitarian intervention, if ren-
dered, might well be hostile to the intervention, since to date the Court in post hoc interpreta-
tions concerning the use of force has eschewed progressive interpretations of the law. See 
The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Military and Paramilitary 
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Land and Maritime Boundary (Came-
roon v. Nig.; Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 2002); Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6). 
 41 U.N. Charter, supra note 30, art. 52(1). 
42 Id. art. 53(1). 
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humanitarian intervention, which might—if certain hurdles can be over-
come—have a very different impact than the irregular and politicized post
hoc reactions of the institutions discussed above. 
II.  CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT THE ICC 
Article 5(1)(d) of the Rome Statute includes the “crime of aggres-
sion” as one of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court.43 Yet the ac-
tual exercise of that jurisdiction was made conditional. According to Article 
5(2), the Court shall only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
once an amendment to the Rome Statute is adopted, which would define the 
crime and set forth the conditions under which the Court can exercise its 
jurisdiction in this regard.44 It is anticipated that the Assembly of States 
Parties, formed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute, will vote at 
their review conference in 2010 to amend the Rome Statute so as to allow 
ICC exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In considering the 
effect, if any, of such jurisdiction on the legality of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, three core issues must be considered: (1) the hurdles that must 
be overcome in the process of amending the Rome Statute; (2) whether 
substantively the act of unilateral humanitarian intervention will be within 
the scope of the new jurisdiction; and (3) what decision-maker will “trigger” 
the application that jurisdiction for any given incident. 
A. Hurdles for Amending the Rome Statute 
As is the case whenever one prognosticates about the possible ef-
fects of a new treaty (or, as in this case, amendment to an existing treaty), 
there are certain procedural hurdles that must be overcome before any poss-
ible effects can unfold. First, the Assembly of States Parties does have to 
vote at its review conference in 2010 to amend the Rome Statute. At least a 
two-thirds majority is needed to adopt an amendment;45 it is possible that 
the matter will be deferred and it is even possible that no amendment ever 
occurs. Second, once adopted, it is generally thought that seven-eighths of 
the existing member states must ratify or otherwise accept the amendment 
before, after one year, it can enter into force.46 As of July 2008, there were 
  
43 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1)(d) July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
44 Id. art. 5(2); see Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an Inter-
national Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 10 (1999) (discuss-
ing the treatment of the crime of aggression in the negotiation of the Rome Statute). 
 45 Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 121(3). 
46 Id. art. 121(4). Some delegations at the negotiations have argued that Article 5(2) of the 
Rome Statute only requires adoption of the crime at the review conference, with no further 
need for ratifications. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of 
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110 parties to the Rome Statute, which means at least 97 states would need 
to ratify any amendment, a process that could take many years.  
Third, normally once an amendment of the Rome Statute enters into 
force; it binds all the states parties, even those parties that have not yet rati-
fied the amendment.47 In this case, however, since the amendment is ex-
pected to alter Article 5 of the Rome Statute, there is a special provision in 
the Rome Statute that results in the amendment only binding those states 
who have ratified or accepted the amendment. As such, it is generally 
thought that any state party who does not accept the amendment may avoid 
exercise of the Court’s new jurisdiction with respect to acts committed by 
that state’s nationals or on its territory.48If this is correct, then states that are 
currently parties to the Rome Statute—including those most likely to en-
gage in acts of humanitarian intervention, such as France or the United 
Kingdom—could decline to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression, which would then preclude the Court from addressing their con-
duct. Therefore, even if the amendment enters into force, if the powerful 
states parties take advantage of the opt-out clause, the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over this crime will be seriously diminished.  
Fourth, while there are 110 parties to the Rome Statute, there are 
some 82 states that have not yet ratified the Statute and are not bound by it, 
whether amended or not. As such, the conduct of a significant percentage of 
states worldwide (43%) are outside the scope of the ICC—including certain 
major powers that might engage in future interventions (China, Russia, the 
United States)—leaving the ICC with little ability to address all incidents of 
potential humanitarian intervention whenever they arise. This problem may 
be overcome by continuing the gradual adherence by states to the Rome 
Statute; it is not yet clear whether a plateau inmembership has been reached 
or whether ratifications will continue apace. Alternatively, it is possible that 
the ICC states parties will craft or interpret the ICC’s new jurisdiction so as 
to cover acts of humanitarian intervention by non-party states whenever 
they are directed against party states. If so, the ICC may regard itself as 
capable of exercising its jurisdiction by virtue of the aggressive act being 
                                                     
the Special Working Group, Seventh Session (second resumption), ¶ 10, ICC Doc. ICC-
ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Special Working Group Report]. If such 
a view were to prevail, it would remove a significant hurdle to the activation of this crime.   
47 Id. 
48 Id. art. 121(5). Once seven-eights of the parties ratify or accept the amendment, any 
party who has not accepted it may also withdraw completely from the Rome Statute. Id. art 
121(6). The anomaly presented by Article 121(5) has led to extensive discussion in the nego-
tiations over alternative possibilities for entry into force, to preclude parties from opting out 
of the Court’s jurisdiction over this crime. See 2009 Special Working Group Report, supra 
note 46, ¶¶ 6–9. Again, if any of these proposals were to prevail, it would remove one of the 
hurdles to activation of this crime. 
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inflicted upon one of its parties, thus expanding the range of acts encom-
passed by the new jurisdiction. 
In short, there are several important, threshold hurdles that must be 
overcome before the ICC will have robust jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. If any of these hurdles are not surmounted, then the effects of 
this jurisdiction on the debate over legality or illegality of humanitarian 
intervention will be severely reduced if not eliminated, because the ICC’s 
jurisdiction will not be applicable to the wide range of state conduct within 
which such interventions may arise. 
B. Whether the New Jurisdiction Will Encompass Acts of Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention 
Assuming that the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is 
established, and is applicable to a wide range of states, then an important 
question is whether that jurisdiction will encompass acts of unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention. Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute, the Unit-
ed States opposed inclusion of the crime of aggression in part because it 
believed deployment of force for “humanitarian purposes” had transformed 
the issue of aggression into a far more complicated concept than was the 
case at Nuremberg or Tokyo.49 That position, obviously, did not prevail, 
suggesting that the states negotiating the Rome Statute ultimately decided 
that, whatever complications might exist in either including or excluding 
humanitarian intervention, the matter could be addressed as part of the 
process of defining the crime. The Preparatory Commission established 
following the Rome Conference did not squarely address the issue of huma-
nitarian intervention,50 nor to date has the Assembly of States Parties or its 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, which was created in 
2002 to discuss the definition, elements, and jurisdictional conditions of the 
crime of aggression. While some external observers have suggested express 
treatment of this issue, such as by carving out unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention from the crime of aggression,51 so far no language to that effect has 
  
49 See Press Release, International Criminal Court Preparatory Committee on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, Legal Prosecution of Aggression Required 
Agreed Definition, Preparatory Committee on International Criminal Court Told, at 2, U.N. 
Doc.   L/2765 (Mar. 27, 1996) (recounting position taken by the United States). 
 50 See Roger S. Clark, Rethinking Aggression as a Crime and Formulating Its Elements: 
The Final Work-Product of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859 (2004) (discussing background on the work of the Prepara-
tory Commission on the crime of aggression). 
51 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Deterring Aggression by Law - A Compromise Proposal (Jan. 
11, 2001), available at http://www.benferencz.org/arts/44.html (unpublished paper). Former 
Nuremberg prosecutor Ben Ferencz proposed that the amendment include the following: 
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emerged publicly in the working group’s proposed articles on the crime of 
aggression.  
Attention has been given, however, to only covering acts of aggres-
sion that are especially grave in nature. Indeed, several states have indicated 
a preference for a definition of aggression that is not co-terminus with Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the Charter,52 viewing aggression as an especially serious viola-
tion of Article 2(4). For that reason, some states proposed to the Preparatory 
Commission that the crime of aggression encompass only conduct involving 
“aggressive” or “large-scale” attacks on territorial integrity that are of a 
“particular magnitude and dimension and of a frightening gravity and inten-
sity.”53 The United States, in its status as an observer, agreed that “the crime 
of aggression be reserved for acts of a certain magnitude and not include all 
uses of force that are inconsistent with article 2, paragraph 4.”54 This prefe-
rence has remained in the discussions within the Special Working Group. At 
the December 2007 meeting, there was broad support for retaining, after the 
term “act of aggression,” the phrase “which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.”55 Some lesser support was expressed for further qualifying “act of 
aggression” by language stating, “such as, in particular, a war of aggression 
or an act which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation 
of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof.”56 
                                                     
[H]umanitarian intervention by the use of force without prior authorization by the 
Security Council shall not constitute an act of aggression if it is shown that the in-
tervention was a last resort after other available means had been exhausted, that the 
intervention was for purely humanitarian purposes and not motivated by the self-
interest of the intervening party, and to the maximum extent possible, was carried 
out in a manner designed to protect the human rights of all persons concerned.
Id.; see also Jennifer Trahan, Defining “Aggression”: Why the Preparatory Commission for 
the International Criminal Court Has Faced Such a Conundrum, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 439, 449 (2002).
 52 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
53 See, e.g., Proposal Submitted by Germany: The Crime of Aggression, ¶ 10, 
PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.4 (Nov. 13, 2000); see also Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression 
for the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (“The 
second benchmark the crime should satisfy is the principle of gravity or seriousness. Aggres-
sion is the ‘mega’ crime . . . It should not be trivialized or made banal by including in its 
definition lesser violations of states’ territory integrity.”). 
 54 United States, Statement by the United States to the ICC Preparatory Commission on 
the Crime of Aggression, at 2 (Sept. 26, 2001) (on file with author). 
 55 International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, Sixth Session, ¶ 25, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/1 
(Dec. 13, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Special Working Group Report]; see also 2009 Special 
Working Group Report, supra note 46, at 11 (repeating this language in draft Article 8 bis, ¶ 
1). 
 56 2007 Special Working Group Report, supra note 55, ¶ 26. 
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At first glance, the inclusion of such “threshold” language might be 
thought to implicitly carve out unilateral humanitarian intervention from the 
scope of the crime, since this intervention has as its objective humanitarian 
concerns not territorial aggrandizement. Yet the act of unilateral humanita-
rian intervention can be just as violent and intrusive as any other large-scale 
use of force, involving extensive aerial bombardment and the deploying of 
extremely large numbers of armed forces from one state to another. The 
“character, gravity, and scale” of Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 
1978, the tripartite intervention in northern Iraq in 1991, or NATO’s bomb-
ing of Serbia in 1999, is comparable in nature or scale to other uses of force 
that presumably are to be encompassed in the ICC’s jurisdiction over this 
crime. Even the more restrictive threshold language defining “aggression” 
as “an act which has the object or result of establishing a military occupa-
tion” does not appear to exclude all humanitarian interventions; in all three 
of the arguably humanitarian interventions noted above, foreign forces re-
mained in the targeted territory for extended periods of time as they accom-
plished their claimed humanitarian objectives. Rather than carve out huma-
nitarian intervention, the purpose of the threshold language now being dis-
cussed in the Special Working Group seems to be to eliminate minor inci-
dents of armed force from the crime of aggression, such as frontier incidents 
involving border patrols or coast guards. While the final language is not 
settled, it does not appear that humanitarian intervention will be either ex-
pressly or implicitly excluded from the ICC’s definition of the crime of ag-
gression. 
A further important development related to defining the crime of 
aggression may be the drafting of the detailed “elements” of the crime by 
the Assembly of States Parties. Article 9 of the Rome Statute provided for 
the adoption by two-thirds of the Assembly of “elements” for the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which now serve to 
guide the ICC judges in their interpretation of such crimes.57 While the 
Rome Statute does not require the adoption of such “elements” for the crime 
of aggression, the Special Working Group was assigned this task, though at 
present it appears unlikely that such elements will be drafted in time for the 
2010 Review Conference (the elements for the other crimes were also not 
completed when the Rome Statute was adopted; they were only completed 
thereafter by the Preparatory Commission prior to entry into force of the 
Rome Statute). Assuming that an amendment to the Rome Statute activating 
the crime of aggression is adopted in 2010, the elements for the crime may 
be developed thereafter and adopted by the Assembly at some point prior to 
entry into force of the amendment. If so, the language of the “elements” of 
the crime of aggression might be quite significant for indicating whether the 
  
57 See Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 9. 
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States Parties believe that humanitarian intervention is regarded as within or 
outside the scope of “aggression” (as well as for indicating whether other 
forms of conduct, such as rescue of nationals, falls within aggression). Al-
ternatively, like the amendment itself, detailed resolution of what constitutes 
aggression might not be possible, leaving the matter ambiguous on the mat-
ter. If the latter, then any effect on the debate over the legality of humanita-
rian intervention will turn on the ICC’s response to incidents of intervention 
as they arise.  
C. The “Trigger” for Applying Jurisdiction over Aggression When a 
Situation Arises 
The Rome Statute requires that one of three conditions must first be 
met prior to the exercise of ICC jurisdiction. For any given crime, the ICC 
may only investigate and prosecute acts that were: (1) committed on the 
territory of, or by a national of, a state party to the Rome Statute; (2) com-
mitted on the territory of, or by a national of, a state that has consented ad 
hoc to the jurisdiction of the ICC; or (3) referred to the ICC by the Security 
Council.58 For the crime of aggression, it is anticipated that there will be an 
additional “trigger” or “filter” before the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction. 
Some of the current proposals before the Special Working Group 
envisage jurisdiction being triggered only if the Security Council has deter-
mined that an act of aggression was committed by a state or, at least, has 
adopted a resolution asking the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation 
(the latter is sometimes referred to as a “strong green light” by the Security 
Council).59 Such proposals are supported by the permanent members of the 
Security Council and by a few other states, but to date are not supported by 
most states parties to the Rome Statute.  
Other proposals envisage allowing the matter, in the first instance, 
to be addressed by the Security Council. However, in the absence of Securi-
ty Council action, these proposals envisage the prosecutor after a period of 
time (e.g., six months) proceeding with the investigation on the prosecutor’s 
own initiative or, alternatively, proceeding if authorized by a “filter” other 
than the Security Council. These filters include: (1) when authorized by the 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber; (2) when the General Assembly has “determined 
that an act of aggression has been committed”; or (3) when the International 
Court of Justice makes such a determination, presumably in the form of an 
  
58 Id. arts. 12–13. 
59 See 2009 Special Working Group Report, supra note 46, at 12 (draft Article 15 bis, ¶¶ 
1–3 & 4 (alternative 1)). For arguments in opposition to the Security Council being the ex-
clusive trigger for ICC jurisdiction over this crime; see Troy Lavers, [Pre]Determining the 
Crime of Aggression: Has the Time Come to Allow the International Criminal Court its 
Freedom?, 71 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2008).    
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advisory opinion after a request by the General Assembly, though possibly 
in the course of a contentious case as well.60 
If the crime of aggression in a particular situation may only be pur-
sued upon a finding by the Security Council that an “act of aggression” has 
occurred, then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime may not have any sig-
nificance whatsoever, let alone have an impact on the legality of humanita-
rian intervention. The Security Council virtually never declares that trans-
boundary uses of force are acts of aggression; even North Korea’s attack on 
South Korea in 1950 and Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait were characterized 
by the Security Council as a “breach of international peace,” not an act of 
“aggression.”61 As such, if the triggering mechanism is a Security Council 
finding of “aggression,” then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime may 
well be still-born.  
If a possible crime of aggression may be investigated simply upon a 
request of the Security Council to the ICC (without a Security Council find-
ing of “aggression”), then the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime might also 
be severely curtailed. The willingness of the Security Council to issue such 
a request may be just as unlikely as a finding of “aggression.” Certainly, 
such a request will not be issued in situations where any of the permanent 
members is the state (or is closely allied with the state) allegedly perpetrat-
ing the aggression. Hence, under this approach the ICC’s jurisdiction might 
be reduced solely to instances where a relatively isolated or “outlaw” state 
has engaged in the conduct (e.g., Iraq in 1990), such that there is sufficient 
support on the Security Council and among the permanent members for 
issuing the request. If so, the erratic nature of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression likely would have little effect in clarifying the legality 
of unilateral humanitarian intervention, for the failure to prosecute such 
conduct as a crime could be interpreted as the result of major power politics, 
rather than a belief that the underlying conduct is permissible. 
A similar outcome may be likely if the amendment only allows the 
ICC to proceed, in the absence of Security Council action, whenever the 
General Assembly or the International Court has “determined that an act of 
aggression has been committed.” Like the Security Council, the General 
Assembly has only rarely found “aggression” to have occurred, letting pass 
by fairly momentous incidents of forceful action within any such condem-
  
 60 2009 Special Working Group Report, supra note 46, at 13 (draft Article 15 bis, ¶ 4 
(alternative 2)). 
61 See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990). In a few instances, some relatively minor in nature, the Security 
Council has declared conduct to be “aggressive” or “acts of aggression.” See UNITED 
NATIONS, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION 225–36 (2003) 
(noting instances relating to Benin, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Tunisia).  
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nation.62 A General Assembly request to the International Court for an advi-
sory opinion63 on whether “aggression” has occurred seems equally unlike-
ly; certainly no such request has been made to the International Court over 
the past sixty years even in situations where blatant aggression has oc-
curred. Moreover, when on the rare occasion that the legality of acts of 
force have arisen on the merits in a contentious case, the Court has limited 
itself to finding a violation of the principle of “non-use of force” expressed 
in Article 2(4) of the Charter (or its counterpart in customary international 
law),64 not a finding of an “act of aggression.”65  
One might speculate that an amendment to the Rome Statute will 
change the practice of the Security Council, General Assembly, or Interna-
tional Court. Arguably, once those institutions know that their determina-
tions concerning aggression will have a collateral consequence for the work 
of the ICC, then those institutions may be more apt to focus on the issuance 
of such a determination. If the amendment has that effect, then perhaps the 
discussion outlined below concerning a triggering mechanism involving just 
the ICC will be relevant for a triggering mechanism that turns on Security 
Council, General Assembly or ICJ action. But if the amendment does not 
  
62 See HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO AGGRESSION, supra note 61, 
at 242–50; see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 21 (2d ed. 
2004) (citing as examples Turkey’s incursion into Cyprus, Iran’s attack on commercial ship-
ping during the Iran-Iraq War, and the United States in Grenada and Nicaragua). 
 63 While the Security Council could also ask for such an advisory opinion, the presump-
tion here is that the Security Council is unwilling or unable to act. Certain specialized agen-
cies of the United Nations have also been empowered to ask advisory opinions of the Inter-
national Court, so long as the matter is within the scope of the organization’s mandate. In this 
instance, it seems likely that no specialized agency would be found competent to ask such a 
question. For the Court’s conclusion that the World Health Organization was not competent 
to ask a question about the legality of nuclear weapons see Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts, Advisory Opinion, 4 (1996).  
64 See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); Military and Parami-
litary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 92 (June 27); Land 
and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.; Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 450 
(Oct. 10); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Repub. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, 227 (Dec. 19).  
 65 At best, one might try to argue that the Court’s findings in these cases are the functional 
equivalent of a finding of “aggression.” See Mark S. Stein, The Security Council, The Inter-
national Criminal Court, and the Crime of Aggression: How Exclusive is the Security Coun-
cil’s Power to Determine Aggression?, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 18–25 (2005). That 
argument is unpersuasive, given the care with which the Court (like the Security Council) 
chooses its language, as well as the Court’s refusal to find “aggression” even when specifi-
cally requested to do so by a party in the case. It is especially unpersuasive in the context of 
Oil Platforms, given that, while the Court did find that the U.S. actions could not be justified 
as measures “necessary to protect the essential security interests,” the Court nevertheless 
found no violation of international law within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. Oil Plat-
forms (Iran v. U.S.) 98 AM. J. INT’L L, 554 (July 2004). 
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change existing practice, then it seems that any approach to the triggering of 
ICC jurisdiction that requires action by those institutions would have little 
effect in clarifying the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
If, however, the language ultimately adopted in amending the Rome 
Statute allows for the prosecutor to proceed in the absence of Security 
Council action, either on the prosecutor’s own initiative or after authoriza-
tion by the Trial Chamber, then there may well be significant ramifications 
over the long term for the debate on the legality of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention. In such circumstances, the mere fact that the ICC mandate is 
broad enough to allow the prosecution of leaders that engage in humanita-
rian intervention will likely not affect the debate about the legality of huma-
nitarian intervention. Only if the Rome Statute were amended so as to ex-
pressly identify unilateral humanitarian intervention as a form of aggression 
would the position of opponents of the legality of humanitarian intervention 
be strengthened, just as an express exclusion of such intervention as a form 
of aggression would strengthen the position of humanitarian intervention’s 
proponents. What will count is how the ICC responds when incidents of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention arise. Prosecutions, or at least indict-
ments, of leaders of those interventions will considerably strengthen the 
hand of those who oppose unilateral humanitarian intervention. Yet an un-
willingness on the part of the ICC to indict and prosecute those leaders—an 
outcome that seems quite likely for incidents of true humanitarian interven-
tion—will lend considerable credence to the view that unilateral humanita-
rian intervention is either lawful or tolerated by the international communi-
ty. 
An ICC prosecutor (or prosecutor in conjunction with the Pre-Trial 
Chamber) is extremely unlikely to indict the leader of a state who has em-
barked on a transboundary use of force that is truly designed to end a wide-
spread deprivation of human rights. If the intervention is conducted in a 
manner approximating the kinds of criteria that have been identified for 
“true” humanitarian intervention—such as the five criteria of “legitimacy” 
formulated by the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges and Change66—both legal and political dynamics will push the pros-
ecutor away from indictment. The legal dynamics include the general dis-
cretion the prosecutor has not to indict in situations where it would appear 
unjust to do so, which undoubtedly will exist when the intervening state is 
attempting to stop a very seriousness threat to human lives, has exhausted 
other available means, and is limiting the intervention to what is necessary 
and appropriate to remove the threat. The Rome Statute provides that the 
prosecutor, when deciding whether it initiate an investigation, shall consider 
  
 66 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 21, ¶ 
207. 
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whether, “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of 
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investi-
gation would not serve the interests of justice.”67 Further, to the extent that 
there is uncertainly about the criminality of a particular kind of conduct, the 
Rome Statute provides that the “definition of a crime shall be strictly con-
strued” and that in “case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in 
favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”68 Finally, 
the Rome Statute provides that a person shall not be criminally responsible 
if the person is acting to reasonably defend other persons,69 or in circums-
tances where the conduct was caused by “duress resulting from a threat of 
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against” 
persons, so long as the person “acts necessarily and reasonable to avoid this 
threat” and “does not intend to cause a greater harm that than the one sought 
to be avoided.”70 Provisions of that sort provide a prosecutor with ample 
ability to engage in a nuanced assessment of whether in a given situation the 
overall interests of justice have been served by conduct that might technical-
ly fall within the scope of aggression, but that should not be sanctioned.71 
Moreover, the legal dynamics may include certain benefits secured 
by the Prosecutor from the intervention, since the target state might well be 
one harboring persons already under indictment by the ICC and the inter-
vening states can assist in bringing those persons into ICC custody (an initi-
ative they will be less enthusiastic about if their leaders are themselves fac-
ing indictment). The political dynamics include the difficulty for the ICC of 
condemning an intervention that is either popular or largely tolerated by 
states and the broader global community, particularly if intervenors are a 
collective of states that are generally supportive of the ICC, perhaps includ-
ing major financial supporters. Even of the intervenor is just a single state, if 
the objective is to oust a horrific regime, one that has committed extensive 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and perhaps even genocide (Idi Amin 
in Uganda or the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia), the ICC’s political stature 
may suffer considerably if it is perceived as protecting that regime. 
  
 67 Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 53(1)(c). On the interplay between prosecutorial dis-
cretion to make decisions based on “interests of justice” and the traditional prerogatives of 
the Security Council under Chapter VII, see Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security, and Prosecu-
torial Discretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2008).    
 68 Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 22(2). 
69 Id. art. 31(1)(c). 
70 Id. art. 31(1)(d). 
 71 For an argument on why “necessity” should excuse state responsibility for humanitarian 
intervention (as opposed to excusing criminal responsibility of state leaders), see Ian John-
stone, The Plea of “Necessity,” in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention 
and Counter-terrorism, 43 COLUM. J TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 357–566 (2005). 
368 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:341 
Could the Prosecutor find a way to avoid indicting the leaders of the 
intervening state(s) without establishing any precedent for the legality of the 
intervention? As is the case for statements by public officials of states, it is 
certainly possible for the ICC Prosecutor to be silent or at least vague about 
the reasons for not initiating a prosecution, or to announce that lack of evi-
dence exists on certain points necessary to pursue a criminal case against 
government leaders.72 Obfuscation can go a long way in making it difficult 
for a clear legal precedent to emerge. At the same time, there may be consi-
derable pressure upon the prosecutor to indicate clearly the position being 
taken by the ICC, just as there was when various states, human rights organ-
izations, and others charged that NATO’s conduct of the 1999 bombing 
campaign against Serbia violated the laws of war. In that instance, the chief 
prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) felt compelled to establish a committee within the Office of the 
Prosecutor to examine the allegations. After receiving and reviewing the 
committee’s detailed report (which was subsequently made public), she 
informed the U.N. Security Council that there was no basis to open a crimi-
nal investigation into any aspect of the NATO campaign.73 Similarly, in a 
situation where the ICC has declined to investigate or prosecute the leaders 
of a campaign of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the ICC prosecutor 
may be expected to report to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute on the factors that led to that decision, including specific reasons 
why the intervention is considered “humanitarian.”74 
  
 72 Defendants before the ICC are presumed innocent, with the onus on the prosecutor to 
prove guilt. Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 66. Not only must the materiel elements of the 
crime be proven, but also that the defendant committed those acts with intent and knowledge, 
id. art. 30, with no mistake of fact or law negating that mental intent. Id. art. 32.     
 73 For the prosecutor’s statement to the Security Council, see U.N. SCOR, 4150th mtg., at 
2–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4150 (June 2, 2000). For the committee’s report, see ICTY, Final Re-
port to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Cam-
paign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000). 
 74 While the Rome Statute provides that the Office of the Prosecutor shall act independent-
ly, the Assembly of States Parties is mandated to provide management oversight to the Pros-
ecutor. Rome Statute, supra note 43, art. 112(2)(b). At each meeting of the Assembly, the 
Prosecutor addresses the Assembly, providing a detailed update of the situations and cases he 
is handling. See, e.g., Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Address to the Assem-
bly of States Parties (Nov. 30, 2007). Further, the ICC Secretariat prepares annual reports to 
the Assembly on the work of the major organs of the ICC, including the Office of the Prose-
cutor. See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Report on Programme Performance of the 
International Criminal Court for the Year 2007, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/7/8 (May 26, 2008). In 
instances where a situation has been referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council, the 
Prosecutor reports directly to the Council on the matter. See, e.g., Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Seventh Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (June, 5 2008), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C4584AF2-6A72-4BB0-94E6-45F43CE18F68/277787 
/UNSC_2008_En.pdf. 
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The ICC might also try to argue that its failure to condemn an inter-
vention as “aggression” does not necessarily mean that the ICC regards the 
intervention as a lawful use of force, since the ICC’s concept of aggression 
aims at the most grave of forcible acts. For two reasons, however, that dis-
tinction may not prove significant. First, while the current drafts on the de-
finition of aggression do contemplate a narrower class of forcible actions 
than those covered by Article 2(4), the forcible actions being excluded seem 
relatively insignificant, such that the term “aggression” is an inexact but 
close approximation of Article 2(4). Indeed, the proposed amendment leans 
heavily on the General Assembly’s 1974 resolution on the definition of ag-
gression, which begins by stating that “[a]ggression is the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations”75—language that mimics Article 2(4). As 
such, it will not seem very credible for the ICC to argue that an act of hu-
manitarian intervention falls outside the scope of its crime of aggression, 
unless the intervention is of a very minor nature (e.g., a speedy rescue of 
hostages that involves no loss of life). Second, a distinction of this type will 
likely be lost in the public domain; when the ICC determines that the lead-
ers of an intervention will not be investigated or indicted for aggression, the 
natural perception is that the ICC believes the intervention to be legal. Ar-
guing that an intervention might still be a violation of Article 2(4) but just is 
not within the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction is the type of position that will 
likely gain little traction in the realm of political and popular discourse, 
which tends to approach such issues in more a black/white (legal/illegal) 
fashion. 
Establishing the unlikelihood of the ICC indicting the leaders of 
states who embark on unilateral humanitarian intervention is difficult, given 
the embryonic status of the ICC. In an attempt to at least sketch out this 
point, however, the next section considers what would have happened if an 
ICC with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression had existed at the time of 
NATO’s intervention with respect to Kosovo.  
  
 75 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 6, art 1. 
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III. WOULD THE ICC HAVE INDICTED NATO’S LEADERSFOR THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION FOR THE KOSOVO INTERVENTION?76 
A. Effect of ICC Jurisdiction Prior to the Kosovo Intervention 
The underlying facts of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Serbia (then 
known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or FRY) on behalf of Kosovar 
Albanians has been amply recounted elsewhere and will not be repeated 
here.77 Needless to say, given that the intervention seemed largely directed 
at protecting an ethnic group from its own government (a government that 
had unleashed considerable strife in the Balkans in the first half of the 
1990s), the intervention stirred an extensive debate about its legality, with 
considerable attention focusing on whether the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention was a viable component of contemporary international law.78 
Assuming the existence of an ICC at the time with jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression, would that fact alone have inhibited NATO states 
from engaging in such intervention? Article 2(4) of the Charter itself is 
broad enough in scope to be viewed by many states and scholars as preclud-
ing humanitarian intervention, yet that fact alone did not inhibit NATO 
from proceeding. Rather, most NATO states asserted that their conduct was 
lawful without reliance on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention for 
support.  
For example, the United States relied upon various factors that, 
when taken together, the United States believed justified the action. These 
factors included: (1) the commission by the FRY military and police of se-
rious and widespread violations of international law in the FRY province of 
Kosovo against Kosovar Albanians; (2) the threat that FRY actions in Ko-
sovo could lead to a wider conflict in Europe; (3) the FRY’s failure to 
comply with agreements with NATO and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe regarding FRY actions in Kosovo; (4) the FRY’s 
failure to comply with Security Council resolutions regarding FRY actions 
in Kosovo; (5) the FRY’s failure to cooperate with the International Crimi-
  
 76 Comments in Part II on the Kosovo incident draw in part upon reflections made by the 
author at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law in 2000. See Sean 
D. Murphy, The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-Shaping Incident?, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 302, 302 (2000). 
77 See, e.g., THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO 
REPORT (2000); TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE (2000); IVO H. DAALDER & 
MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO’S WAR TO SAVE KOSOVO (2000).    
 78 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 824 (1999). 
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nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and (6) the FRY’s failure to abide 
by its own unilateral commitments.79 
Would the additional factor of the ICC possibly indicting NATO 
leaders have altered the situation? The answer to that question would seem 
to turn on whether NATO leaders would have anticipated the ICC indicting 
them, for only then might NATO leaders have been deterred. Since the ICC 
is a new institution, there is no track record for understanding its practice 
for issuing indictments in such situations and, until that practice settles, the 
ability to deter may be weak. The next sub-section concludes that the ICC 
likely would not have indicted NATO leaders for their intervention in Ko-
sovo. If that assessment is correct, and if NATO leaders would have pre-
dicted a similar outcome, then the existence as of early 1999 of an ICC with 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression likely would not have had any ef-
fect in deterring the Kosovo intervention. 
B. Likelihood of ICC Prosecution after the Kosovo Intervention 
After conducting an investigation, a prosecutor considering whether 
to indict leaders of NATO for the Kosovo intervention would likely have 
begun with the text of the Rome Statute and the elements of the crime of 
aggression. The analysis would have continued by noting that the U.N. 
Charter prohibits the use of force (Article 2(4)) absent Security Council 
authorization (under Chapters VII or VIII) or when acting in self-defense 
(Article 51). Although there were certain Security Council resolutions 
passed in advance of the intervention relating to Kosovo, which in part rec-
ognized the situation as a “threat to international peace and security,” those 
resolutions did not authorize the use of force.80 And, although some asser-
tions were made that Europe as whole was threatened by the conflict in Ko-
sovo (since other states such as Turkey and Greece might become in-
volved), those assertions seemed thin at the time and even thinner today. In 
any event, NATO and its member states did not report the intervention to 
the Security Council as provided for in Article 51. State practice since 
enactment of the Charter has not altered these basic provisions of the Char-
ter.81 As such, at first glance it seems that a prosecutor would have viewed 
  
79 See SEAN D. MURPHY, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1999-2001, 
392–94 (2002). 
 80 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); see S.C. Res. 1160, 
S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199, S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, 
S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998); S.C. Res. 1239, S/RES/1239 (May 14, 1999). 
 81 On pre-Kosovo practice, compare MURPHY, supra note 1, at 83–144, and Jean-Pierre L. 
Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 CAL. 
W. INT’L L.J. 203 (1974) (finding little support in state practice for unilateral humanitarian 
intervention), with TESÓN, supra note 15 (finding support). 
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the decision by NATO leaders to unleash the intervention as a crime of ag-
gression.82 
At the same time, the prosecutor would have been confronted with a 
constellation of other factors weighing against indictment. First, the prose-
cutor would have presumably seen some significance in the types of factors 
that animate the natural law tradition. Under that tradition, rather than just 
parse the language of the Charter and related state practice, the natural law 
theorist would emphasize the moral necessity of acting to prevent the wide-
spread deprivation of human rights. This tradition emphasizes that any in-
ternational rule focused on the preservation of order at the expense of jus-
tice is destined to fail, and thus the law must allow for intervention in ex-
treme cases. Since intervention to protect human rights seeks neither to alter 
territorial boundaries nor to depose existing governments, it does not en-
danger the core attributes of sovereignty that Article 2(4) seeks to protect 
territorial sovereignty. While everyone would prefer the original Charter 
scheme of a well-functioning Security Council capable of deploying forces, 
the unfortunate reality is that the Security Council has no such forces at its 
disposal and, due to political exigencies, at times is paralyzed from even 
authorizing individual states to act on its behalf, such as occurred with re-
spect to the crisis in Kosovo. In such situations, states cannot be expected to 
stand by while people die; the Charter was not a suicide pact.83 If the prose-
cutor perceived such factors to be present, then it would weigh against in-
dictment; for all prosecutors, their discretion not to indict turns not solely on 
the formal content of the law, but on extraneous factors that are more con-
textual in nature. 
Second, a prosecutor would no doubt be influenced by the fact that 
this “unilateral” humanitarian intervention involved sixteen NATO coun-
tries—fully democratic and therefore fully accountable to their people—
collectively deciding that the intervention was justified as a matter of inter-
national law and policy. Thirteen of those countries actually engaged in the 
bombing campaign. Further, while some non-NATO states asserted that the 
  
82 See, e.g., Ian Brownlie & C. J. Apperley, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the 
International Law Aspects, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 878 (2000), & Further Memorandum, 49 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 905 (views by counsel for the FRY as to why the intervention was nei-
ther legal nor “humanitarian”); Jonathan Charney, NATO’s Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 834, 834 (1999) (“Indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bombing cam-
paign violated the United Nations Charter and international law.”); Bruno Simma, NATO, the 
UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) (examining the legality 
of the threat or use of force just prior to the bombing campaign). A few positivists believe 
that prior to the intervention in Kosovo there was sufficient state practice to support humani-
tarian intervention in extreme cases. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, International Law 
and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo, 49 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 926 (2000). 
 83 See W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comments: NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo’s 
Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860 (1999). 
2009] CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 373
intervention should not have gone forward without Security Council autho-
rization, many non-NATO states supported the intervention.  
There were, of course, states that quite openly opposed the interven-
tion, notably China, India, and Russia, as well as states typically hostile to 
all major actions pursued by the United States, such as Cuba. And there 
were other states that were clearly uneasy with the intervention but fell short 
of formally condemning it. Public protests occurred in various states 
worldwide. Yet, while reasonable minds can differ, the intervention re-
ceived relatively widespread acceptance—whether viewed as affirmative 
support or passive toleration—of a kind not seen in some prior incidents of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention. In light of this, for a prosecutor to 
claim that the intervention in Kosovo was unlawful would likely face consi-
derable criticism from a variety of quarters.  
Third, the prosecutor would have noted the reactions of key interna-
tional organizations to the intervention. In particular, when a resolution 
condemning the air campaign was placed before the Security Council on 
March 26, 1999, the resolution was defeated by a vote of 12 to 3.84 Among 
those 12 states were several non-NATO members, such as Argentina, Ba-
hrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, and Slovenia. Similarly, a Russian 
draft resolution before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights calling for 
“an immediate cessation of the fighting” and attributing “victims and ca-
sualties amongst the civilian population [to] missile strikes and bombings” 
failed by a vote of 11 to 24, with 18 states abstaining.85  
The prosecutor would have noted that the General Assembly did not 
condemn the intervention, as it did when Vietnam intervened in Cambodia 
in 1978 and when the United States intervened in Grenada and Panama in 
1983 and 1989. Nor did the General Assembly even pass a resolution de-
manding a withdrawal of forces, as it did when India intervened in East 
Pakistan in 1971. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor would have noted that the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference declared that “a decisive international 
action was necessary to prevent humanitarian catastrophe and further viola-
tions of human rights” in Kosovo.86 
Fourth, the prosecutor would be influenced by the series of factors 
that ultimately led to the first deployment of war by NATO forces since its 
inception: (1) in Serbia, there was a government with a track record of brut-
al ethnic cleansing that was inflicting increasing levels of violence against a 
  
 84 U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg., at 6, UN Doc. S/PV.3989 (Mar. 26, 1999). 
 85 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the 
Fifty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 35–36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167 (July 20, 1999). 
 86 See Iran Ambassador Nejad Hosseinian, Letter Dated 31 March 1999 from the Perma-
nent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, annex, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/1999/363 (Mar. 31, 1999). 
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civilian population in one of its historically autonomous regions; (2) the 
Security Council had expressly identified actions taken by the government 
as a threat to the peace which could lead to humanitarian catastrophe even if 
it had not yet; and (3) that government had refused to abide by the demands 
of the Security Council, including agreements that the government itself has 
made with the international community and that had been endorsed by the 
Security Council. 
Fifth, the prosecutor would be influenced by the “end game” of the 
intervention: are the interveners seizing territory as part of their “humanita-
rian intervention” or is there conduct generally perceived as limited to what 
is necessary and proportionate in carrying out the humanitarian objective? 
In the case of Kosovo, the Security Council itself—with Russia’s affirma-
tive vote—ultimately accepted the reality of the intervention by authorizing 
activities associated with the cease-fire agreement, an agreement negotiated 
fully with Russian involvement.87 While Serb forces were basically expelled 
from Kosovo, Kosovo did not fall within the dominion of an aggressor; it 
was patrolled by a NATO-led multinational coalition, including Russian 
troops. Again, Security Council action to move forward with conflict man-
agement should not be viewed as a wholesale endorsement by all Security 
Council members of all preceding actions, but Russia’s and China’s wil-
lingness to support this new U.N. administered territory would likely have 
influenced the decision of an ICC prosecutor as to whether to indict. 
Sixth, the prosecutor perhaps would be influenced by the broader 
scenario unfolding in terms of crimes other than the crime against aggres-
sion. In a situation of true humanitarian intervention, it is likely that the 
leaders of the targeted state have committed violations in the form of crimes 
against humanity, genocide, or widespread war crimes. As such, the ICC 
may well be focused on the leaders of the targeted state, just as the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the time of 
the Kosovo intervention was already focused on Serbia’s leader, Slobodan 
Miloševi, for his conduct in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In 
May 1999, in the midst of the NATO bombing campaign in support of Ko-
sovar Albanians, Miloševi was indicted for 340 counts of murder, stem-
ming from seven separate massacres, and some 740,000 forced deportations 
from Kosovo since the beginning of 1999.88 For an international criminal 
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tribunal to declare, on the one hand, that the leaders of a country committed 
acts of violence against civilians but, on the other hand, it is a crime for 
others to stop them, would place the tribunal in a very awkward position.  
Similarly, if the tribunal determines that the intervening states ad-
hered to the jus in bello in the course of their intervention—as was deter-
mined by the ICTY in assessing NATO’s conduct in the Kosovo interven-
tion89—that too may influence the prosecutor’s decision regarding the crime 
of aggression. While as a theoretical matter, it is certainly possible to com-
mit a violation of the jus ad bellum while committing no violations of the 
jus in bello, it might prove politically awkward to find the former but not 
the latter.  
Finally, while a prosecutor may be somewhat insulated from exter-
nal pressures, and is not a political entity such as the Security Council or 
General Assembly, only the most naive observer would reject the possibility 
of political influences on the prosecutor. A prosecutor would have had to 
possess a rather sturdy confidence to proceed with indictments for the crime 
of aggression against multiple leaders of Western democratic states, includ-
ing U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Cana-
dian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
and the Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema, especially when some of 
those countries are major financial supporters of the tribunal. Indeed, some 
observers believe NATO did commit jus in bello violations in the course of 
its bombing campaign,90 such that one explanation for the lack of indict-
ments with respect to jus in bello crimes is the old saw “don’t bite the hand 
that feeds you.” 
IV. EFFECTS OF CRIMINALIZING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The ironic effect of activating a crime of aggression that is broad 
enough in scope to cover an act of unilateral humanitarian intervention may 
be to crystallize, over time, a norm that regards such intervention as lawful. 
Assuming that the crime of aggression (and associated elements) is drafted 
so as to neither expressly include nor exclude unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention, and instead to simply criminalize large-scale transboundary uses of 
force, the definition will sweep within its range humanitarian interventions 
that take the form of bombing campaigns or deployment of military forces, 
such as was seen in NATO’s action against Serbia in 1999. Assuming fur-
ther that the Security Council, General Assembly, or International Court of 
                                                     
http://secint24.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ai010629e.htm. 
89 See ICTY, Final Report, supra note 68 (finding no evidence of law of war violations). 
90 See Amnesty Int’l, “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws 
of War by NATO During Operation Allied Force, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/E 
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Justice are not the sole triggering mechanisms for determining if an act of 
aggression has occurred, then considerable discretion will be accorded the 
ICC prosecutor (perhaps in conjunction with the Pre-Trial Chamber) to de-
termine which forcible acts are lawful and which are not. As such, when the 
ICC is confronted in the years to come with an intervention that is not au-
thorized by the Security Council but that is truly humanitarian, it seems 
likely that the ICC will not regard such conduct as aggression, resulting in a 
perception that unilateral humanitarian intervention is lawful.  A further 
effect may be clarification by the ICC of what constitutes “true” humanita-
rian intervention. As indicated in Section II, when deciding not to investi-
gate or prosecute the leaders of states that have engaged in such interven-
tion, the ICC prosecutor may feel compelled to explain publicly why ICC 
action is not forthcoming. Presumably the prosecutor would focus on the 
kinds of criteria that have been previously suggested for humanitarian inter-
vention, such as by the recent U.N. high-level panel or in the academic 
community.91 
This article has focused on how activating the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression may affect the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention. However, if the analysis above is correct, then there may be a va-
riety of other effects relating to other types of transnational uses of force, 
such as the use of military force by one state against another state to rescue 
its nationals or to restore to power a democratically-elected leader who was 
ousted by a military coup. Like humanitarian intervention, these other forms 
of transnational use of force have their critics and supporters when it comes 
to assessing legality. Were the ICC to begin weighing in on whether such 
forcible actions constitute aggression, it may considerably influence the 
legal debate, leading to crystallization and clarification of the relevant norm 
one way or the other.  
If all this comes to pass, the result may be to place the ICC in a very 
significant position as the ultimate arbiter of lawful uses of military force, 
one that will shape the contours of the jus ad bellum over the next genera-
tion. Supporters of the ICC may welcome this development, applauding its 
ability to clarify a field of law that currently seems unstable and, at times, 
ineffective.92 If the Security Council remains unable to act because of major 
power resistance, the ICC—perceived as objective and non-political in na-
ture—may emerge as the relevant voice in condemning or blessing transna-
tional uses of force. 
  
91 See Report of the High-level Panel, supra note 21, ¶ 207; MURPHY, supra note 1, at 
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Yet such power would bring with it considerable risks. If the ICC is 
seen as the “go-to” arbiter for whether an intervention is permissible, and if 
the ICC blesses an intervention as humanitarian and not aggressive in na-
ture, then considerable political repercussions may flow for the ICC if the 
intervention ultimately goes poorly, perhaps with the intervening state(s) 
mishandling relief operations, inadvertently provoking internal strife, failing 
to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by the intervention, or neglecting funda-
mental rule of law initiatives necessary to stabilize the targeted state. Con-
versely, the ICC might condemn, through the issuance of indictments, a use 
of force that ultimately proves extremely successful in replacing a tyrannic-
al regime with one that is much more disposed toward representative de-
mocracy and human rights. Further, if there is insufficient consistency and 
practice in the role of the ICC in this area, broader adverse consequences 
might unfold as well. Unless the relevant lines are clearly drawn by the ICC, 
the core normative structure of the jus ad bellum might be weakened, espe-
cially if a belief emerges that some undefined forms of non-defensive force, 
undertaken without Security Council authorization, are acceptable. Moreo-
ver, to the extent that the ICC emerges as the central player in assessing the 
legality of recourse to force, it does so at the expense of the Security Coun-
cil, which may harm the reputation and status of the global institution 
charged with maintaining international peace and security. (In order to re-
capture that role, the Security Council might be more inclined to address 
squarely the legality of uses of force when they occur, which would be a 
positive development for collective security.) 
Potential “blowback’ from decisions reached by the ICC are not 
fatal to its work, and will occur to some degree in any event for decisions 
reached by the ICC concerning the other types of crimes within its jurisdic-
tion. Yet the stakes are considerably higher with respect to the crime of ag-
gression, and while being at the center of attention has some benefits, it can 
also mean being at the center of a precarious and potentially damaging 
storm. 
